U.S. Embassy Cairo

03/11/2008 01:01:08 م
Moderator : Hello and welcome to today's webchat with Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, Permanent Representative of the U.S. to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Office in Vienna. We are delighted to host this chat and thank you for spending time with us today.

Ambassador Schulte: Hello, thanks for hosting me. I'm glad to be here. I'd like to start out by congratulating Egypt on its election to the IAEA Board of Governors. You have a worthy representative in Ambassador Fawzi.

Egypt assumes this leadership position at an important juncture. Iran continues – in violation of multiple Security Council resolutions - to pursue the technologies that it can use to build nuclear weapons. Syria is not cooperating fully with IAEA efforts to understand the scope of its clandestine nuclear program. Egypt joins the Board at a time of burgeoning interest in nuclear energy. Among the initiatives the IAEA Board is considering to help countries development safe, clean, nuclear energy in a weapons-proliferation resistant manner is the establishment of an international fuel bank. This fuel bank would back up the commercial market in nuclear fuel, giving countries confidence that they do not need to develop their own enrichment capabilities which can be diverted to making nuclear-weapons grade fuel.

With that I welcome your questions.

مرحبا، شكرا على استضافتي. أنا سعيد بوجودي معكم. أود أن أبدأ بتقديم التهنئة لمصر على انضمامها لمجلس محافظي الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية. إن لديكم ممثلا كفئا في السفير فوزي.

تتولى مصر هذا الدور الريادي في مرحلة هامة للغاية. فإيران تستمر – في انتهاك لقرارات مجلس الأمن العديدة – في السعي إلى امتلاك التكنولوجيا التي يمكن استخدامها في تصنيع الأسلحة النووية. وسوريا لا تتعاون بصورة كاملة مع جهود الوكالة لاستيعاب مجال برنامجها النووي السري. تنضم مصر إلى المجلس في وقت يتزايد فيه الاهتمام بالطاقة النووية. ومن ضمن المبادرات التي يتناولها المجلس لمساعدة الدول على تطوير الطاقة النووية النظيفة الآمنة في إطار منع انتشار الأسلحة النووية هي مبادرة لتأسيس بنك وقود دولي يهدف إلى دعم السوق التجاري بالوقود النووي ومنح الدول الثقة اللازمة لتطوير قدراتها التخصيبية التي يمكن توجيهها لجعل الأسلحة النووية وقودا.

وبهذا أرحب بأسئلتكم.

03/11/2008 01:10:37 م
Moderator : :

Ambassador Schulte: Before I start answering your questions, let me explain more why Iran’s nuclear activities are of such concern to the world community.
I have been in Vienna over three years. During this time, IAEA inspectors have dug deeper into Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities. They have not done so with the full cooperation of Iran. Instead, Iran’s cooperation has only come late, under pressure, and sometimes not at all.
Agency inspector are now examining the most troubling of questions – indications that Iran has engaged, at least until recently, in activities with “possible military dimensions.” This is IAEA terminology for activities that are relevant to designing and manufacturing a nuclear weapon and fitting on a delivery system. Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei, the IAEA’s Director General, has called this “a matter of serious concern.” We agree. Unfortunately, as we read in the Director General’s last report, Iran’s authorities are providing no cooperation in the IAEA’s investigation of these activities.
At the same that that Iran’s leaders refuse to cooperate with the IAEA, they continue to violate multiple resolutions of the UN Security Council. These resolutions require Iran, among other things, to suspend its pursuit of capabilities to enrich uranium. There are two reasons to enrich uranium: (1) to produce fuel for nuclear reactors and (2) to produce material for a nuclear weapon. Iran claims to be pursuing the first course, but the world has strong doubts for a number of reasons.
· First, Iran has no nuclear power reactors. It has one under construction at Bushehr, but it has already received its fuel from Russia.
· Second, most countries with nuclear power, particularly with a small number of reactors, procure their nuclear fuel on the international market rather than investing in sensitive and expensive technologies for enrichment. Iran’s leaders have repeatedly turned down international offers to provide guaranteed access to nuclear fuel, insisting instead on developing enrichment capabilities that make no commercial sense.
· Third, Iran began its enrichment program in secret, in violation of its IAEA safeguards commitments, and in conjunction with the A. Q. Khan network, an illicit market in nuclear weapons technology. Countries did not turn to the Khan network for civil nuclear technology; they dealt with Khan if they wanted a bomb.
Iran’s leaders do not need enrichment capabilities for a civil power program. But they do need enrichment capabilities if they wish to build a bomb. To build a bomb with uranium, Iran’s leaders can choose one of two routes. They can produce low-enriched uranium at in the underground bunkers at Natanz, purportedly for nuclear power reactors that they do not have, then kick out the inspectors and process it to weapons-grade uranium. Alternatively, and of greater concern, they can use the technology that they are mastering and the expertise that they are developing to build a covert enrichment facility at another site. Indeed, last year, in a further violation of its safeguards agreement, Iran announced that it would not notify the IAEA of its intention to build new nuclear facilities.
This is why countries across the world are seriously concerned about the nuclear activities of Iran and the intentions of its leadership.
Iran’s leaders already pose significant dangers to the Middle East. They sponsor terror. They threaten the stability of neighboring countries, including Lebanon and Iraq. They oppose the Middle East peace process. They threaten to eliminate one Middle East country. They seek regional hegemony. Imagine those same leaders armed with nuclear weapons.
Even if Iran’s leaders never used nuclear weapons, they could feel emboldened to use terrorism, violence, and extremism more aggressively. Moreover, other countries in the Middle East might feel compelled to reconsider their NPT commitment. This could spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, a region already full of danger and instability.
Thus Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons technologies poses a real risk to the Middle East and the global nonproliferation regime. This is why we are concerned. This is why the Security Council is engaged. And this is why countries around the world have joined together in a diplomatic effort to persuade Iran’s leaders to change course.
The United States and Egypt are part of that international diplomatic effort and our goals are the same: to persuade Iran’s leaders to cooperate with the IAEA and to comply with the international obligations established by the UN Security Council; to convince them that negotiation and cooperation are preferable to continued noncompliance and confrontation.

03/11/2008 01:13:10 م
Gamal Essam El-Din - Ahram Weekly : My question: How does Mr Shulte see the growing interest of Arab countries, especially Egypt, in launching nuclear power programmes and does not he think that Israel's possession of nuclear weapons - rather than Iran - is the main reason behind this interest?

Ambassador Schulte: President Bush has made it clear that it is a U.S. policy priority to make nuclear energy more available to the people of the developed and developing worlds alike.

The United States recognizes that an increasing number of countries -- from Europe to Asia, from the Middle East to Africa, and in the Americas -- are looking to nuclear energy as a way to preserve existing energy supplies, diversify energy sources, and protect the environment. We already have a formal Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Egypt, and we stand ready to assist Egypt in the development of a safe and secure nuclear power program to meet the country’s increasing energy needs. And we applaud Egypt’s early conversations with the IAEA.

The United States encourages and supports the peaceful uses of nuclear technology as long as the countries involved observe their international obligations and meet international standards regulating safety, nonproliferation, export controls, and physical security.

03/11/2008 01:14:26 م
علاء عبد العزيز : هل الوكالة لها دور فى معالجة قضايا الشرق الاوسط بالفعل وهل سيتم التعامل مع اسرائيل مثل العراق وكوريا وهل سيتم تعويض العراق عن الخسائر التى تسببت فيها الولايات المتحدة

Ambassador Schulte: إن الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية هيئة فنية وظيفتها مساعدة الدول على تحقيق الاستفادة المثلى من التكنولوجيا النووية مع ضمان أن يحدث هذا بأمان وسلام دون المساهمة في انتشار الأسلحة النووية.

هذا يعني أن الوكالة تساعد على مناقشة التحديات في الشرق الأوسط ولكن ليس كل التحديات.

يمكن للوكالة أن تساعد دول الشرق الأوسط على تقييم القوة النووية كمصدر للطاقة واستخدام التكنولوجيا النووية لتطوير الصحة والزراعة والمساعدة على اكتشاف ومنع البرامج النووية السرية.

في أبريل 2008 أخطرنا المدير العام للوكالة السيد البرادعي بمنشأة سرية تقوم سوريا بإنشائها في الصحراء قرب مدينة الكيبار . نعتقد أن المنشأة كانت مفاعلا نوويا يبنى سرا في خرق لاتفاقية سوريا مع الوكالة. كان يتم إنشاء المفاعل بمساعدة كوريا الشمالية وبصفات مشابهة لمفاعل كوريا الشماية النووي في يونجبيون. تم إبطال مفعول مفاعل يونجبيون الآن ، ولكن تم استخدامه لانتاج البلوتونيوم المستخدم في الأسلحة النووية لكوريا الشمالية.

إن سعي سوريا لامتلاك هذه الإمكانيات بالتعاون مع كوريا الشمالية أمر يستحق القلق والاهتمام.

سعت سوريا إلى إخفاء المنشآت الجاري بناؤها. قام المهندسون السوريون بدفن خطوط تبريد المياه الجارية من وإلى نهر الفرات وبناء الحوائط والأسطح الزائفة لإخفاء الشبه بين المنشأة ومفاعل كوريا الشمالية في يونجبيون. بعد تدمير المفاعل في سبتمبر 2007 سعت سوريا إلى إخفاء الأدلة.

يقوم مفتشو الوكالة الآن بالتحقيق. فقد ذهبوا إلى الكيبار مرة ولكنهم طلبوا المزيد من المعلومات من السلطات السورية كما طلبوا زيارة مواقع أخرى. هدفهم الآن هو تحديد طبيعة المنشأة المدفونة والتأكد من أن سوريا لا تقوم بإخفاء أي من الأنشطة النووية الغير معلنة. إننا نتطلع إلى الحصول على تقرير من المدير العام لاجتماع مجلس الوكالة هذا الشهر.

تدل هذه الحالة على أن الدول ما زال بإمكانها إخفاء الأنشطة الغير شرعية عن الوكالة. إن سوريا واحدة من الدول القليلة التي رفضت تبني البرتوكول الإضافي للوكالة الذي يمنح مفتشي الوكالة معلومات إضافية وحق الوصول إلى المنشآت. ربما نفهم السبب الآن. ولكن الحالة تدل على الدور الهام للوكالة في التحقيق في الأنشطة النووية السرية ونأمل في زيادة إمكانية اكتشاف الأنشطة وتقليل خطورة الانتشار النووي.

03/11/2008 01:19:11 م
atta abd el aal \ journalist : بلدكم الولايات المتحده الامريكيه تؤكد دائما انها تعمل من اجل السلم العالمى واستقرار العالم وهذا القول لايتفق مع مواقف بلدكم فى تأييد أسرائيل لعدم الانضمام لمعاهدة حظرالانتشار النووى فما تفسيرك لهذا التناقض ؟والى أى مدى تعتقد ان الشعب الأمريكى يؤيد مواقف حكومتكم المنحازة دائما لأسرائيل؟وهل تجد ثمة تفسير لمثل هذه المواقف وسعى الجماعات المتشدده فى منطقة الشرق الأوسط لأمتلاك أسلحه نوويه لمواجهة مواقف حكومتكم الظالمه ؟
ما حقيقة قيام حكومة بلدكم الحتله لدولة العراق بنقل آلاف الأطنان من اليورانيوم العراقى الى بلدكم؟ وماتداعيات مثل هذه الخطوة على انتشار الأسلحه النوويه فى منطقة الشرق الأوسط ؟

Ambassador Schulte: إسرائيل واحدة من الدول القليلة التي لم توقع اتفاقية حظر انتشار الأسلحة النووية. تؤيد الولايات المتحدة – مثل مصر- الالتزام العالمي بالاتفاقية. هذا يعني أننا نريد الدول التي لم توقع على الاتفاقية – متضمنة إسرائيل – أن توقع عليها كدول غير محتوية على الأسلحة النووية.

وعلى نطاق أوسع، نحن ننضم لمصر والدول الأخرى في دعم رؤية منطقة شرق أوسطية خالية من الأسلحة النووية. في الحقيقة، الولايات المتحدة تدعم شرق أوسط خال من جميع أسلحة الدمار الشامل وأنظمة توصيلها.

ولكن هذه الرؤية لا يمكن تحقيقها على الفور. بالإضافة إلى تفاصيل التنفيذ والضمان ، أرى عقبتين رئيسيتين لابد من التغلب عليهما.

أولا: إننا نحتاج إلى تقدم أكثر في عملية السلام. لا يمكن جعل المنطقة خالية من الأسلحة إلا إذا شعرت الدول بالأمان على حدودها. اليوم، قيادة دولة واحدة هي إيران تعارض عملية السلام وتمد المتطرفين بالسلاح وتدعو إلى إزالة دولة شرق أوسطية من على الخريطة.

ثانيا: نحتاج إلى التزام كامل. اليوم، إيران تسعى إلى امتلاك تكنولوجيا نووية حساسة في خرق واضح لقرارات مجلس الأمن وغياب للمتطلبات المدنية. وطالما يستمر القادة الإيرانيون في طريقهم هذا ، يقترب خطر سباق التسليح النووي في الشرق الأوسط أكثر من وعد المنطقة الخالية من السلاح.

في الحقيقة، في فبراير 2006 عندما انضم السفير المصري السابق إلي وإلى أعضاء آخرين بالمجلس في التصويت لإخطار مجلس الأمن بأنشطة إيران، أدركنا كجزء من القرار أن "حل القضية الإيرانية سيساهم في الجهود الدولية لحظر الانتشار وإدارك هدف جعل الشرق الأوسط منطقة خالية من أسلحة الدمارالشامل متضمنة نظم التوصيل." (الترجمة العربية لنص قرار مجلس الوكالة على الموقع: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf )

إذا فإننا نؤيد حظر جميع الأسلحة النووية في الشرق الأوسط. ولكن قبل أن نتمكن من تحقيق هذه الرؤية علينا أن نوجه مشكلة أكبر وأكثر تهديدا.

03/11/2008 01:24:18 م
Fathiya Al Dakhakhni- Al Masry Al Youm : Egypt and the US signed an agreement to cooperate in the nuclear field in the 1980s. What is the status of this agreement? Will it be renewed after the Egyptian nuclear program is launched?
What is your vision on the Egyptian talks with Russia and China on nuclear cooperation? Why are there no Egyptian-American talks in this regard?
What is your vision on the recently prepared Egyptian nuclear program?
What is your position on the suggested international nuclear bank?
Why is the international community concerned about the Syrian and Iranian nuclear programs? Why are there no similar concerns about the Israeli Program?
What are the steps planned to be taken against Iran if it continues its nuclear program? Is a military strike still an option?

Ambassador Schulte: We support the Egyptian government's assessment of nuclear power as a source of electicity for the future. Like any country, Egypt's authorities will want to weigh carefully the utility of nuclear power and look at the steps needed to introduce nuclear power safely and securely.

We have invited Egypt to participate in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, which now has 25 partners. This is an opportunity for Egypt to shape the future of nuclear power while assessing its own needs. We hope that they join.

In conjunction with GNEP, we strongly support the concept of an international fuel bank administered by the IAEA. A fuel bank would help countries get access to nuclear power by giving them enhanced confidence in the international market. At the same time, it discourages the spread of sensitive enrichment technologies, which Mohammed ElBaradei has called a "loophole" in the NPT.

Syria’s construction of a secret nuclear reactor, in cooperation with North Korea, is obviously a matter of great concern.

Syria went to great lengths to disguise the facility under construction. Syrian engineers buried the water cooling lines running to and from the Euphrates and even built false walls and a false roof to mask the facility’s similarity to North Korea’s reactor at Yongbyon. After the reactor was destroyed in September 2007, Syria also went to great length to hide the evidence. It hauled away the rubble at night, bulldozed much of a nearby mountain over the reactor remains, and – remarkably – built a new building on top!

IAEA inspectors are now investigating. They have been to al-Kibar once, but have asked for more information from Syrian authorities and for visits to other locations. Their goal is to verify the nature of the now-buried facility and to ensure that Syria is not hiding any other undeclared nuclear activities. We look forward to a report from the Director General for the IAEA Board meeting later this month.

03/11/2008 01:26:19 م
muhamed ibrahem abdul hay al naghi : Today's Russian officials indicate that Russia is seeking to develop federal nuclear capabilities, including a real danger on scientific advances in the United States to maintain Why did not the United States and American scientists in particular that he needed a decade of industry and scientists such as these very large sums of money to restore the Numbers

Why did not the United States and Atomic Energy Commission to use of the International Tribunal against the regime in Iran to making nuclear weapons despite the existence of material evidence and more nuclear weapons .(lettle nuclear weapons) and the presence of physical evidence showing the invalidity of these regimes to possess these weapons poses a real danger to Arab countries, U.S. interests

Uranium enrichment and are on a full swing in
Iranian reactor and scientists have benefited from technical Iranians to enrich uranium to make atomic bomb targeted the military and they actually succeeded in obtaining accounts and equations for this technical information through the study of the Institute of MIT or the United States for not doing what the U.S. government shut down these sites

Why not put the United States in Hsaptha the seriousness of Iran's nuclear program to the security and safety of the people of Arab States and the United States to acquire technical and especially the Iranian side and that the program was designed by Iranian military launchers will be loaded with enriched uranium dumping aircraft from the threat of Arab States to assist in case The United States and what measures taken by the United States for the protection of Arab States

Why the U.S. government delayed in dealing with Iran's dossier from the first program in Iran now there have high technology to enrich uranium produced from Natanz and Iran for more than an atomic bomb is a great danger to the Middle East, Iran has already become the atomic bomb the United States to delay the deal With the Iranian file iran governmnet they have atomic bomb from the frist theory from enrich uran i shore you

Material evidence to nuclear technology is in power reactors reach Why did not the IAEA monitors permanently to know the real nuclear capabilities of Iran or that he is forbidden to IAEA monitoring stations power up to reactors

We regret all the closure of the U.S. embassy in Syria and next days i hope good news to usa embassy in syria

thank you for intersted

Ambassador Schulte: The United States and the IAEA have turned to the UN Security Council to deal with Iran’s nuclear file.

The Security Council has found Iran’s program to be a threat to international peace and security and imposed several sets of sanctions. We, like many states, are hoping that this international sanction and pressure will convince Iran to suspend its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and come to the negotiating table, hopefully preventing the need for further sanction or international action.

The United States has tried to deal with Iran's nuclear program as expeditiously as possible. Iran’s covert program was exposed in late 2002 and the IAEA began to investigate the details of this covert program. We have been relying on the IAEA, in cooperation with member states, to make progress in understanding the nature of Iran’s past and current nuclear activities. Unfortunately, because of Iran’s stonewalling and lack of full cooperation, this process has taken nearly 6 years.

03/11/2008 01:28:30 م
حسام العايدى : سيادة السفير أعتقد ان الإداره الامريكيه تكيل بمكيالين فيما يتعلق بالاسلحه النوويه فهى تبارك لاسرائيل امتلاكها للكثير من الاسلحه وفى نفس الوقت لتدخل لمنع حصول أى دولة آخرى من الحصول على تكنولوجيا نووية من أجل الاغراض السلمية فما هو تعليقكم على هذا الأمر

Ambassador Schulte: الولايات المتحدة لها مكيال واحد أن الدول لابد أن تلتزم باتفاقاتها الدولية . إنه معيار تشارك فيه الدول الأخرى، منها مصر.

لقد وقعت معظم دول العالم على اتفاقية خظر انتشار الأسلحة النووية. والتزامها بهذا الاتفاقية هام للغاية.

للأسف، قامت إيران وكوريا الشمالية بخرق الاتفاقية، وتستمر إيران في هذا الانتهاك بادعاء أنها تسعى إلى الأنشطة السلمية في حين أن الوكالة لا يمكنها التأكد من هذا وأن معظم دول العالم لديها الشك في برنامج إيران.

إسرائيل حالة مختلفة. إنها إحدى الدول القليلة التي لم توقع على الاتفاقية . لقد انضمت الولايات المتحدة إلى مصر والدول الأخرى في دعوة الدول التي لم توقع الاتفاقية إلى الانضمام إليها كدول غير مالكة للأسلحة النووية.

تنفذ الولايات المتحدة التزاماتها تحت الاتفاقية. إننا نساعد الدول الأخرى في الاستفادة السلمية من التكنولوجيا النووية. في الحقيقة إننا أكبر مساهم لأنشطة التعاون الفني للوكالة المخصصة لهذا الغرض. كما أننا نقوم بتفكيك أسلحتنا النووية بمعدل كبير. في الشهر الماضي فقط، أعلن وزير الطاقة الأمريكي للمؤتمر العام للوكالة أن مخزون الأسلحة النووية الأمريكي قد تم خفضه إلى أقل مستوى منذ تولي الرئيس ايزنهاور قبل 50 عاما.

03/11/2008 01:40:18 م
Hanaa Al Agamy - Al Ghad Newspaper : - will the US continue to escalate the Iranian issue even under the new administration?
- If Iran continues its program, what will be the reaction of IAEA?
- Are there American pressures on IAEA to take a firm stance on Syria and Iran?
- What are the updates on the six party talks on North Korea’s program?
- Why doesn’t everybody abide by the peaceful use of nuclear energy? Why don’t nuclear-weapon states give up their nuclear arms?
- Why does US apply a double standard on the Israeli nuclear program?

Ambassador Schulte: Tomorrow are the U.S. elections. I cannot speak for any of the candidates. But I have listened carefully to what they have said about Iran.

Both leading candidates have expressed grave concern about Iran's nuclear activities. Both have called for a diplomatic solution without ruling out other options. Both have called for tougher diplomacy and tougher sanctions.

So I think that Iran will be at the top of any new Administration's to-do list.

The United States works closely with the IAEA and its Director General Mohammed ElBaradei -- a great Egyptian, by the way -- on nonproliferation cases like Iran and Syria. We have strongly supported IAEA inspectors in conducting their investigations and look closely to their reports to shape our response.

We also support a strong IAEA role in verifying the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program. IAEA inspectors are already at Yongbyon monitoring its disablement, and we want them to continue playing an important role in that our goal is to get North Korea back into the NPT and under IAEA safeguards.

Most countries in the world, like yours and mine, abide by their commitments to the NPT. It's only a small number of countries -- ones like Iran, Syria, and North Korea -- that have failed to meet their international obligations.

States have a variety of reasons to violate these obligations. Together we can cooperate to convince renegade states that they can better achieve security and prestige by upholding commitments rather than confronting the international community.

The United States is carrying out its obligations under the NPT both by supporting the peaceful use of nuclear technology and by reducing our own nuclear stockpile. At last month's meeting of the IAEA General Conference, the U.S. Secretary of Energy announced that the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons had been reduced to its lowest level since the 1950s -- and reductions continue!

As I mentioned in a prior answer in Arabic, the United States has one standard: Countries should abide by their international commitments. It’s a standard that other countries, including Egypt, share.

Most countries in the world have signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT). The commitments they have adopted under this Treaty are of paramount importance.

Unfortunately, Iran, like North Korea, has violated its NPT commitments. Moreover, Iran continues to abuse the treaty, claiming that it is pursuing peaceful activities when the IAEA cannot certify this and when most the world’s countries have strong suspicions about Iran’s program.

Israel is a different case. It is one of the few countries that have not signed the NPT. The United States has joined with Egypt and other countries across the world in calling on countries that haven’t signed the NPT to sign it as non-nuclear weapons states.

03/11/2008 01:43:20 م
Manal Ahmed : Egypt always calls for a region free of weapons of mass destruction, because this will bring peace and prosperity to all countries of the region, including Israel too. What are the steps the United States will take to cooperate with Egypt in that?

Ambassador Schulte: As I mentioned in a previous reply in Arabic, we join Egypt in supporting the vision of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the United States goes further: We support a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction including their delivery systems.

But this vision cannot be realized overnight. In addition to the details of implementation and verification, I see two major hurdles that need to be surpassed.

First, we need significantly more progress in the peace process. A weapons-free zone is unlikely to be achieved unless the countries of the region feel secure within their own borders. Today, the leadership of one country – Iran – is actively opposing the peace process, arming extremists who sue violence to undermine it, and calling for one Middle East state to be wiped off the map.

Second, we need full compliance with existing commitments. Today Iran is flagrantly pursuing sensitive nuclear technologies in violation of Security Council resolutions and with no apparent civilian requirement. As long as Iran’s leaders pursue this path, the risk of a Middle East nuclear arms race seems more imminent than the promise of a weapons free zone.

Indeed, in February 2006, when the previous Egyptian ambassador joined with me and other IAEA Board members in voting to report Iran to the UN Security Council, we recognized as part of the resolution that “ a solution to the Iranian issue would contribute to global nonproliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery.”

So, yes we support abolishing all nuclear weapons in the Middle East. But before we can achieve that vision, the United States and Egypt must first deal with a much larger and threatening problem staring us in the face.

03/11/2008 01:43:32 م
mahmoud el nawagy : تحية طيبة وبعد
مرحب بك فى بلادك الثانى
1- امتى امريكى تحقق اكتفاء زاتى من الطاقة عن طريق الطاقة النواوية
2-هل الطاقة النواوية تصنع عن طريق القطاع الخاص ام الدولةوهل هى تخدع للعرض والطلب والربح والخسارة وممكن اى احديملك المال ان يشترية
3- هل الوكالة تعمل على تائمين النفيات النواوية والسيطرة على المدافن النواوى
4- هل ممكن للوكالة الكشف او تامين الومفاعل فى اى دولة

Ambassador Schulte: 1- إن الطاقة النووية جزء هام من خليط الطاقة في الولايات المتحدة، حيث تولد 20% من الكهرباء كما أن الكثير من المرافق الكهربية تخطط لإنشاء مفاعلات نووية لسد احتياجات الطاقة. يمكنكم قراءة المزيد عن الطاقة في الولايات المتحدة على الموقع http://www.eia.doe.gov/fuelnuclear.html

2- تتبع الدول المختلفة نماذج مختلفة لقطاع الطاقة، حيث يكون البعض قطاع طاقة قومي يدار بواسطة الحكومة في حين أن البعض الآخر قطاع خاص يعتمد على متطلبات السوق. أنا أشعر بالارتياح الأكبر عندما تقوم الحكومة بصنع القرار الخاص بالطاقة النووية، وذلك لأسباب اقتصادية. ونظرا لوجود خطر انتشار الطاقة النووية، إننا نشجع الدول على صنع الخيارات الاقتصادية والعمل مع الوكالة والدول الأخرى على الاستفادة من التكنولوجيا والطاقة من تقليل مخاطر الانتشار النووي.

3- تغطي الوكالة أنشطة تحديد المخلفات المشعة والتصريف والسحب ومعالجة الموقع. يغطي العمل التخطيط والتكنولوجيا والطرق اللازمة للإدارة الآمنة والسليمة للأنواع المختلفة من المخلفات المشعة.

4- تتولى الوكالة تأمين مفاعلات الدول الموقعة على الاتفاقية بالإضافة إلى المفاعلات الأخرى في دول مثل الهند (الغير موقعة على الاتفاقية) . نجاح الوكالة في اكتشاف المفاعلات يعتمد على تعاون الدول الأعضاء الذين تلزمهم الاتفاقية بإخطار الوكالة بمثل تلك الأنشطة ، حتى قبل إنشائها. إلا أن بعض الدول مثل إيران وسوريا قامت مؤخرا بخرق تلك الالتزامات.

حتى يمكن مساعدة الوكالة على آداء وظيفتها، تم توقيع البروتوكولات الإضافية لمنح المفتشين صلاحيات الوصول إلى المواقع وطلب المعلومات. للأسف لم تقم كافة الدول، متضمنة الشرق الأوسط بهذا.

03/11/2008 01:55:20 م
Salah Begermy : The IAEA’s plan is unclear concerning nuclear weapons in the middle east, especially with Israel and Iran.
What would be the situation if Egypt wishes to possess a nuclear weapon to protect its borders?
Does IAEA work against the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Or against the access of Arab countries to these weapons?
Israel used illicit nuclear bombs in its war against Lebanon 2 years ago. what is the IAEA’s comment?
What is your advice to Egypt after its accession to the board?

Ambassador Schulte: I have an excellent working relationship with Ambassador Fawzy, Egypt's outstanding ambassador in Vienna, and I look forward to working with him even more closely as Egypt joins the IAEA Board.

The Board of Governors will be addressing a wide range of issues in the next two years:
-- helping the growing number of countries interested in nuclear power to generate electricity;
-- establishing an international fuel bank to help give countries reliable access to nuclear fuel without spreading sensitive technologies;
-- securing sensitive material that could be used by terrorists in our great cities;
-- working to resolve the tough nonproliferation cases, like Iran, Syria, and North Korea;
-- reshaping the IAEA for future challenges and threats.

The IAEA's role is to help countries get peaceful benefit from nuclear technology while reducing the risk of nuclear weapons spreading to more countries. This is not aimed against Arab states. In fact, it is in the interest of all Arab countries that the IAEA be strong and do its job effectively.

Like Egypt, most countries in the Arab world want to benefit from civil nuclear technology -- but don't want more nuclear weapons introduced into the world.

Our common goal is to prevent nuclear weapons from ever being used again, which is best achieved by preventing their spread, supporting disarmament, and keeping them out of the hands of terrorists.

My advice to Egypt is to work with other Board members to strengthen the Agency, to support its efforts to detect and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to help the Agency help countries interested in nuclear power make appropriate choices. I look forward to working closely with Ambassador Fawzy on these important goals.

03/11/2008 02:08:23 م
Khadiga Hamouda - Anbaa : Can we talk about Egypt’s accession to IAEA? And how can we benefit from that?
What is the agenda of the next IAEA meeting?
How will IAEA deal with the Syrian nuclear program? What are the members’ suggestions?
Israel is a nuclear threat in the Middle East. How does IAEA deal with that?
What are the updates of the Iranian issue?
Are there concerns from IAEA about Arab nuclear energy programs?

Ambassador Schulte: The IAEA Board next meets on November 27. Key issues on our agenda will be: technical cooperation with developing countries; the nonproliferation concerns posed by Iran, Syria and North Korea; and the future of the Agency in light of tomorrow's challenges.

On Syria, we expect a report by the Director General. Under pressure from the Board, Syria allowed one visit by inspectors to the site of the destroyed nuclear reactor at al Kibar. However, Syrian authorities have refused to answer the many questions posed by the IAEA inspectors and to grant access to other suspicious sites.

So far Syria seems to have adopted the tactics of Iran, both in the Board room and on the ground with the inspectors. Syrian authorities are refusing access, delaying cooperation, and challenging the IAEA's mandate.

We hope that Syria takes a different course -- that taken by Libya. When caught developing an illicit nuclear weapons program, Libya's government came clean, fully disclosed its activities, and fully cooperated with the IAEA. At our last Board meeting, the Board adopted a resolution acknowledging this cooperation and noting that Libya's file had returned to routine.

On Iran, I expect that the Director General's report will be short -- short because there is not much to report other than Iran's continued noncompliance with Security Council resolutions and repeated failure to provide IAEA inspectors with the information and access they require.

Here in Vienna, we are very worried about indications that Iran has engaged in clandestine activities "with possible military dimensions." This is IAEA terminology for efforts to build a nuclear weapon and a nuclear-capable delivery system. Iran has dismissed this information as "fabrications" but Mohammed ElBaradei has refused to accept this description and calls it a matter of "serious concern."

Indications that Iran has conducted nuclear weapons-related work, at least until recently, are particularly troublesome when combined with its continued pursuit of capabilities that can be used to produce material for a nuclear bomb.